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This study documents a general decline in the volatility of employment growth 
during the period 1956 to 2005 and examines its possible sources.  Estimates from a 
state-level pooled cross-section/time-series model indicate that aggregate and state-level 
factors each account for an important share of the total explained variation in state-level 
volatility.  Specifically, state-level factors have contributed as much as 16 percent, while 
aggregate factors are found to account for up to 46 percent of the variation.  With regard 
to state-level factors, the share of state total employment in manufacturing and state 
banking deregulation each contributed significantly to fluctuations in volatility. 
Aggregate factors that are quantitatively important in accounting for volatility include 
monetary policy, the state of the national business cycle, and oil-price shocks.     1
The Great Moderation is defined by a sharp drop in the volatility of most 
macroeconomic variables since the mid-1980s (e.g., Kim and Nelson, 1999, Stock and 
Watson, 2002, and McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000). The magnitude of the decline in 
volatility is substantial: For the nation, growth of output has been one-half and growth of 
employment two-thirds less volatile than they were in the 1960s and 1970s.   
 However, while the change in volatility between the pre- and post-1984 sub-
periods was substantial, there were large movements in volatility within each of the two 
sub-periods as well. For example, we estimate that employment growth volatility 
decreased by around 80 percent between 1958 and 1964. Similarly, volatility grew by 
450 percent from 1997 to 2002. We believe much is to be gained by studying the 
macroeconomic forces that have underpinned changes in employment growth volatility 
throughout the past 50 years.  
While there is a large literature that examines the volatility pattern of aggregate 
economic variables and considers their determinants, there are few studies that use state-
level data to better understand the factors driving fluctuations in volatility.
1  In this 
regard, we first document the variations in employment growth volatility across states 
since the mid-1950s.  We then apply panel regression techniques to identify underlying 
sources of the fluctuations in volatility.  The regressions are structured to capture the 
effects of aggregate factors, state-specific responses to aggregate factors, and 
idiosyncratic state developments, both time varying and time invariant.   
We find that aggregate and state-level factors separately explain important shares 
of the total variation in state-level volatility. Specifically, aggregate factors are found to 
                                                 
1Recent studies that used state-level data to examine volatility include Carlino, DeFina, and Sill (2003), 
Anderson and Vahid (2003), Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2008), and Grennes, Guerron-Quintana, and 
Leblebicioğlu (2009).   2
account for up to 46 percent of the explained variation, while state-level factors have 
contributed as much as 16 percent.  Among the aggregate factors separately identified, 
variation in monetary policy, oil price shocks, and a composite index of business cycle 
activity significantly affected state-level volatility, although to differing degrees.  In 
addition, we find that each of the aggregate factors has had significantly different state 
impacts.  With regard to state-level factors, the share of state total employment in 
manufacturing and state banking deregulation each contributed significantly to 
fluctuations in volatility.  
The addition of state-level data to the analysis of volatility provides a number of 
benefits compared to using aggregate data alone.  A key benefit is the greater number of 
samples (48 for states compared with one in an aggregate study) and the corresponding 
additional dispersion that allows more precise estimation of factors thought to influence 
fluctuations in volatility.  Another benefit is the mitigation of endogeneity issues that can 
plague aggregate studies.  For example, studies that attempt to attribute volatility changes 
to shifts in monetary policy need to separate the impacts of policy from the reaction of 
policymakers.  Since monetary policy does not likely react to individual state-level 
developments, the issue of endogeneity is much less of a concern in a state-level analysis 
of volatility.  In regression studies of aggregate volatility, unobserved heterogeneity 
across states that affects volatility will be subsumed in the regression error term.  This 
unobserved state heterogeneity would lead to omitted variable bias if the error term is 
correlated with an included regressor.  State deregulation of banking markets is a relevant 
example of how such omitted variable bias might work. Deregulation began in the late 
1970s, the same period in which monetary policy was thought to have improved.  Stock   3
and Watson (2002), for example, attributed 20 percent to 30 percent of reduced volatility 
since the mid-1980s to improved monetary policy.  Yet financial deregulation itself could 
have led to greater aggregate stability, and so failure to control for the effect of 
deregulation on volatility can cause the contribution of monetary policy to be overstated.    
Not all states deregulated their banking markets at the same time, and the staggered 
timing allows us to identify the effects of banking deregulation on volatility.   
Finally, rather than simply restricting aggregate forces to having the same impact 
on every state, the use of state-level data permits a test of whether the aggregate factors 
have differential state impacts, a phenomenon documented in other studies (e.g., Carlino 
and DeFina, 1998 and 1999).   
 
1.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
  Numerous papers have examined the existence and causes of a one-time decrease 
in economic volatility that purportedly occurred in the mid-1980s.  At the macro level, 
relevant studies include Blanchard and Simon (2001), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), 
Orphanides (2001), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Stock and Watson (2002), Kim 
and Nelson (1999), Gordon (2005), and Leduc and Sill (2007).  These studies have 
explored the possible contributions of improved monetary policy, structural changes such 
as de-industrialization and improved inventory control, and good luck in the form of 
smaller shocks to the economy.  A related strand of literature has examined similar 
phenomena using state-level data (Carlino, DeFina, and Sill, 2003, Anderson and Vahid, 
2003, Owyang, Piger and Wall, 2008 and Grennes, Guerron-Quintana, and Leblebicioğlu, 
2009).  These papers tend to find substantial heterogeneity in state volatility.   4
  Alternatively, other researchers have used cross-sectional data for states and 
metropolitan areas to analyze the role of industrial diversification on cross-sectional 
differences in output and employment stability and instability. These studies typically 
focus on the average unconditional volatility of a variable’s quarterly or annual growth 
over some single period (e.g., 1970 to 1990).  The findings of these studies are somewhat 
mixed, but the bulk of the evidence indicates that more industrially diverse locations tend 
to be associated with lower employment volatility (Siegel, 1966, Conroy, 1975, Kort, 
1981, Malizia and Ke, 1993, and Sherwood-Call, 1990).
2   Some studies, however, find 
no evidence favoring the diversity-stability view (Jackson, 1984, using multicounty 
aggregates for Illinois, and Attaran, 1986, for all states). 
 
2. MEASURING STATE-LEVEL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH VOLATILITY 
  We focus on employment growth because it is a widely used indicator of real 
activity at the state level, is available quarterly, and extends sufficiently far back in time 
to track longer-run movements in the series.  Real state GDP was considered; however, 
consistent and reliable data are available beginning only in 1977, and only on an annual 
basis.  State personal income data exist for the entire period of our study but only in 
nominal terms.   
  We measure state-level volatility using an approach similar to that in Morgan, 
Rime, and Strahan (2004).  Specifically, the quarterly growth rate of state employment 
(measured as log differences) is regressed on state dummies ( i a ) for the period 1956:3 to 
2005:2: 
                                                 
2 Using time series data for U.S. states, Anderson and Vahid (2003) and Grennes, Guerron-Quintana, and 
Leblebicioğlu (2009) find that reductions in income growth volatility are associated with greater industrial 
diversification.   5
    it 0 Employment growth ii t aaε = ++.  (1) 
 Volatility is then measured as the absolute value of the regression error, 
    it Volatility it ε =       ( 2 )  
which is measured as the deviation of employment growth in a given state-quarter from 
the average growth for a given state.
3  The data are seasonally adjusted quarterly 
nonagricultural payroll employment from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  The 
estimated equation has an adjusted R
2 of 0.0671.  F-tests indicate both that the state fixed 
effects are jointly significant (p = 0.00) and significantly different from each other (p = 
0.00).   
  Figure 1 shows the average volatility of U.S. quarterly employment growth.
4   As 
can be seen, average employment growth volatility exhibited a general downward trend 
over time.  A simple regression of the smoothed volatility on time produces a negative 
and highly significant coefficient.  Despite the general declining trend in average state 
employment growth volatility, there is considerable time variation in volatility around the 
trend, with volatility increasing dramatically in periods of recession (e.g., the early years 
of 2000).    
Similarly, the data reveal considerable variation across states.  Figure 2 displays 
kernel density estimates of the frequency distribution for the average state-level 
volatilities.
5  The distribution generally has a normal shape with an elongated right tail 
                                                 
3Alternatively, other researchers have computed volatilities using rolling standard errors or regression 
standard errors from rolling AR(1) models (e.g., Blanchard and Simon, 2001).   However, the use of rolling 
standard errors complicates the panel estimation because it induces serial correlation in the data series.  
4 The volatility series shown in Figure 1 is constructed as the employment-weighted average of state 
volatilities, allowing the weights to change each quarter.  The volatility series is smoothed using a one-
sided four-quarter moving average. 
5Given a kernel K(u), the estimated density function for x is:   6
indicating a few states with especially large volatilities.  Table 1 contains details on the 
levels and trends of the average volatility for individual states.  Regarding the levels of 
volatility, the cross-state mean is 0.571 with a minimum of 0.425 in New York and a 
maximum of 0.859 in Michigan.  Four states (Michigan, Wyoming, West Virginia, 
Nevada, and Arizona) have average volatilities in excess of 0.7.  Consistent with the 
cross-state average data, the volatility in each individual state has a downward trend 
during our sample period, with all but Wyoming’s highly significant.  
It has become popular to analyze volatility by focusing on the post-1984 years 
associated with the Great Moderation.  Studies have, for example, searched for trend 
breaks and have sought to identify the sources of the shift in volatility between the pre- 
and post-break periods.  Nevertheless, as seen in Figure 1, employment growth volatility 
fluctuates widely throughout the sample period, including within the time spans 
researchers identify as being pre- and post-break.  While volatility fell 75 percent 
between 1983 and 1997, it also fell 80 percent between 1958 and 1964.  Similarly, Figure 
1 shows that there are other periods in which volatility increased substantially.  This 
intra-period variation in employment growth volatility is potentially helpful to analyses 
of the sources of fluctuations in volatility (e.g., Owyang, Piger, and Wall, 2008, and 
Grennes, Guerron-Quintana, Leblebicioğlu, 2009).  
3. SOURCES OF STATE-LEVEL EMPLOYMENT GROWTH VOLATILITY 
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where n is the number of observations in the sample and h is the bandwidth. The points at which the density 
is estimated are indicated by x and the data by Xi. The estimates use the Gaussian kernel and an optimal 
bandwidth that minimizes the mean integrated square error. Should we say what h is?   7
  Having documented the substantial and disparate declines in state employment 
growth volatility, this section turns to an examination of the possible sources.  The fact 
that most states experienced volatility declines during the 1956-2005 sample period 
suggests that part of the variance might be due to common state responses to aggregate 
shocks.  A pooled cross-section/time-series, or panel model, is useful in studying the 
determinants of changes in volatility.  In the framework of a panel, time fixed effects 
account for the impacts of aggregate forces that vary over time but not across states and, 
as such, constitute purely macro influences.   
  In addition to common state response to aggregate shocks, it’s likely that states 
have their own unique response to common aggregate shocks. For example, Carlino and 
DeFina (1998, 1999) document that common monetary policy shocks caused differential 
responses in employment and income across states, responses that varied systematically 
with the states’ industrial structures.  Another advantage of a panel model is that it allows 
states to respond differently to common national shocks.  It’s also likely that unique state-
level forces, such as differences in laws, industrial structures, labor force compositions, 
and other demographic dimensions of the population, could account for some of the 
cross-state variation in volatility.  To the extent that these unique state-level forces are 
time invariant, we can use state fixed-effects to account for them. 
  Over time, states can also undergo unique changes that affect volatility.  State 
banking deregulation that began in the late-1970s is an important case in point.  Interstate 
banking may have smoothed credit flows and made state economies much less sensitive 
to the fortunes of their own banks.  However, states deregulated their banks at different 
dates, causing volatility in state economic activity to change asynchronously (Morgan,   8
Rime, and Strahan, 2004).
6   Similarly, as noted by Anderson and Vahid (2003) and 
Grennes, Guerron-Quintana, and Leblebicioğlu (2009), state-specific changes in 
industrial structure can potentially alter the time series profile of a state’s employment 
growth volatility. 
  Accounting for idiosyncratic aspects of state economies is important not only 
because it can help to explain state-level employment volatility changes but also because 
not doing so can lead to an overestimate of the impact of national factors.  Stock and 
Watson (2002), for example, attributed 20 percent to 30 percent of reduced volatility that 
occurred during the Great Moderation to improved monetary policy, while Leduc and Sill 
(2007) place the estimate at about 15 percent.  But financial deregulation occurred at 
roughly the same time that monetary policy is supposed to have improved.  Since 
deregulation itself might have lowered state-level employment volatility (Morgan, Rime, 
and Strahan, 2004), and since it is not possible to control for state-level financial 
deregulation using aggregate data, monetary policy’s role in lowering volatility may have 
been overstated.  
  In sum, state-level employment growth volatility could have been driven by 
states’ common responses to aggregate shocks, states’ different responses to aggregate 
shocks, as well as state-specific forces.  The next section develops an empirical approach 
designed to capture these broad determinants of volatility. 
                                                 
6 In 1978, Maine was the first state to pass a law that allowed entry by bank holding companies from any 
state that reciprocated by allowing Maine banks to enter their banking markets.  Following Maine’s lead, 
states deregulated in waves, with the bulk of them approving legislation to allow deregulation between 
1985 and 1988. With the exception of Hawaii, all states allowed interstate banking by 1993.   9
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND ESTIMATION 
  The analysis in this study uses a two-way fixed effects (state and time) panel data 
model to analyze quarterly data on state employment growth volatility.
7     
 
Empirical Specification 
The sample consists of quarterly data covering the period of 1956 to 2002.
8  The 
sample contains 8,976 observations: 187 quarters of data for 48 states.  Contemporaneous 
and lagged values of each explanatory variable are used to allow for delayed or persistent 
impacts.   
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where: it ε  is the absolute value of quarterly employment growth fluctuations, measured 
as in equation (2);
9 t indexes time (quarters), i indexes the 48 states, and m indexes the 
subset of aggregate explanatory variables to be estimated;  i α  is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for state i and 0 otherwise (state fixed-effect) ; t α is a quarterly time dummy (time 
fixed-effect); t is an aggregate time trend (common to all states) ti is a time trend for state 
i (captures state deviations from the aggregate time trend); dregi,t is the deregulation 
                                                 
7A Hausman test indicated that a two-way fixed effects specification, both for time and states, was 
preferred to a two-way random effects specification.   
8 The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported employment using the SIC classification until 2002 and on a 
NAICS basis thereafter.  Since there is no comprehensive concordance between SIC and NAICS, we only 
use data through 2002 for consistency. 
9 Alternatively, volatility could be measured using 20-quarter rolling standard errors, as others have done 
(e.g., Blanchard and Simon, (2001).  However, this approach complicates the econometric analysis as it 
results in overlapping samples and artificially builds autoregressive patterns in the data. To mitigate this 
problem, it would be necessary to construct non-overlapping samples of volatilities. This would limit the 
panel to eight separate periods, which would be insufficient for the analysis undertaken in this paper.  
   10
dummy for state i; manshare
•
is the growth in the state manufacturing employment share; 
and,  , mt Macro  is the m
th aggregate variable that is interacted with the state fixed-effects. 
  An advantage of a panel approach is that we can account for the common effect of 
all aggregate forces on state volatility using time fixed effects.  A disadvantage is that 
once the model includes time fixed effects, no other purely macro variables can be 
entered because they will be co-linear with the time fixed effects.  However, studies have 
singled out certain aggregate variables (such as changes in monetary policy and oil price 
shocks) as such important determinants of volatility that they will be interacted with our 
state fixed-effects variables to allow states to respond differentially to these aggregate 
variables.  The macroeconomic literature has a longstanding interest in variations in 
monetary policy and oil price shocks in general and special attention has been accorded 
to these variables in the recent literature seeking to explain swings in volatility (Clarida, 
Gali, and Gertler, 2000, Orphanides, 2001, Leduc, Sill, and Stark, 2007, Stock and 
Watson, 2002, Leduc and Sill, 2007, and Hamilton, 1983, 1996, and 2003).  In addition 
to these variables we gauge the state of the aggregate business cycle using a coincident 
index developed in Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti (2008), hereafter ADS.  The ADS index 
will be interacted with the state fixed effects to allow for idiosyncratic state level 
response to aggregate business cycle conditions. 
  We operationalize these aggregate variables as follows.  Monetary policy shocks 
are measured using the general strategy of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1998).  
That is, we estimate a small VAR (described below) in which the federal funds rate is 
included as a policy instrument.  The structural errors from the federal funds rate 
equation are interpreted as shocks to monetary policy.  We then measure changes in   11
monetary policy that are potential sources of more general economic volatility using the 
squared structural residuals.  The idea is that shifts in monetary policy manifest 
themselves as changes in the volatility of policy shocks.  To measure structural monetary 
policy shocks we employ a two-variable VAR that includes four lags of both the federal 
funds rate and the composite index of business cycle activity developed by ADS.  A 
recursive identification scheme is used with the ADS index ordered first.  Consequently, 
aggregate activity (the slow moving variable) is assumed not to respond to monetary 
policy shocks within quarter, while monetary policy (the fast moving variable) responds 
to the aggregate within quarter.  Our measured monetary policy variable is shown in 
Figure 3. 
  The state of the aggregate business cycle is proxied using the level of the ADS 
index.  The ADS index is designed to track real macroeconomic activity at high 
frequency and has zero mean so that progressively more negative (positive) values 
indicate progressively weaker (stronger) business conditions. Its underlying economic 
indicators include weekly initial jobless claims, monthly payroll employment, industrial 
production, personal income less transfer payments, manufacturing and trade sales, and 
quarterly real GDP, and mix high- and low-frequency information and stock and flow 
dynamics.  For this analysis, we aggregate the weekly ADS index into quarterly values.  
The index is plotted in Figure 4. 
   The oil price shock at time t is measured as the net oil price increase over the 
previous 12 months (Hamilton, 2003). Denote the spot price of West Texas Intermediate 
oil as
o
t p .  The net oil price increase (
o
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This measure of oil-price shocks demonstrates a more stable link to real activity than 
does the actual price of crude oil over the postwar sample.   The oil price variable is 
shown in Figure 5. 
 Concerning  state-level  controls, state fixed effects are used to account for time 
invariant idiosyncratic state-level factors that can influence state volatility.  Similarly, we 
use a set of state-specific dummies to indicate when a state allowed interstate banking.  
The dummies equal zero before a state experienced financial deregulation and unity 
otherwise.  The dates of state-level deregulation are from Morgan, Rime, and Strahan 
(2004).   
 Another  potentially  important influence on state-level volatility is a change in a 
state’s industrial structure (Anderson and Vahid, 2003, and Grennes, Guerron-Quintana, 
Leblebicioğlu, 2009).  We capture this possibility using the change in a state’s 
manufacturing employment share.  Finally, the model includes state-specific time trends 
to capture state factors that change gradually over time, such as demographic shifts in 
state populations.  
 
Estimation and Results 
    Prior to  estimation, the variables in equation (3) were checked for non-
stationarity using the Im, Peseran, and Shin (2003) panel unit root test, which allows the 
unit root process to differ across states.  The null of non-stationarity can be rejected for 
employment growth volatility but not for state manufacturing employment share.  Non-
stationarity can be easily rejected for the growth rate of the manufacturing share, and the   13
latter variable is used in the regression analysis.  Since all three macro variables are 
stationary by construction, they can be used in their original level form in the estimations. 
Still, to be on the safe side, we conducted standard ADF tests for each of these variables 
using a trend and six lags.  The null of a unit root process is easily rejected in each case 
(p < 0.000). 
  Estimated coefficients for equation (3) are obtained using a Newey-West 
heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent estimator.  A series of regressions were 
run to determine the appropriate lag length for each macro variable.
10  Based on the 
results from these regressions, four lags of the oil price variable, six lags of the monetary 
policy variable, and three lags of the economic activity index are used, along with their 
contemporaneous values.  
Estimation of equation (3) produced an 
2 0.4944 R = .  Due to the large number of 
state interactions, lags, and state and time fixed effects, it is not practical to display the 
individual estimated coefficients.  Instead, results are summarized in the form of F-tests.  
Test statistics are shown in Table 2 for both the joint significance and equality of 
coefficient values for each of the variables in the model.   
As can be seen, each of the state-level variables is found to be jointly significant 
at the 1 percent level, with the exception of the change in the manufacturing share of 
employment, which is significant at the 10 percent level.  Similarly, F-tests for the 
equality of coefficients are rejected for each variable in the model.  These findings 
                                                 
10The usual AIC or BIC could not be used due to the panel structure of the data.  Instead we estimated 
equation 3 without the state interactions on the macro variables, using five lags of each macro variable and 
of the state manufacturing share.  State interactions are ignored so that average effect can be measured.  
The contemporaneous plus all lags up to the maximum significant lag for a variable were used.  For 
instance, if the fourth lag of the oil price was significant, the contemporaneous through the fourth lag were 
included in the estimation.   14
suggest that state-level influences are important factors determining volatility.  The tests 
are also informative for deregulation and manufacturing shares.  The joint significance of 
the deregulation dummies (F = 116.4) provides new support for the findings of Morgan, 
Rime, and Strahan (2004) in that the present model has considerably more controls than 
theirs. In addition, Morgan, Rime, and Strahan restricted deregulation to have the same 
effect on each state.  As already indicated, our results show that these restrictions are 
perhaps too strict.  An F-test of the null hypothesis of the equality of 48 estimated 
coefficients on the deregulation variable is soundly rejected (F = 115.0). 
The finding that the change in the manufacturing share has a negative and 
significant effect on volatility is consistent with previous findings based on state-level 
data (Anderson and Vahid, 2003, and Grennes, Guerron-Quintana, and Leblebicioğlu, 
2009).   Manufacturing employment shares have been decreasing steadily for decades and 
have not experienced a sudden one-time decrease.  So while they might not reasonably 
explain a one-time change in volatility (such as the Great Moderation), they do appear to 
have contributed to the longer run, more continuous, volatility changes examined in this 
study. 
The results also offer support for an influence of aggregate variables on state-level 
volatility.  The time dummy variables are jointly significant (F = 2.74) and significantly 
different from one another (F = 2.72).  In addition, the results in Table 2 indicate that 
changes in monetary policy, fluctuations in oil prices, and changes in the ADS index have 
all had differential effects on state-level volatility.  Importantly, these aggregate variables 
matter even when all are simultaneously considered.     15
 The findings discussed so far establish the statistical significance of both state-
level and aggregate influences on state employment volatility, and the importance of 
recognizing states’ different responses to aggregate factors.  The question remains as to 
the economic significance of the factors.  That is, how much of the actual variance in 
state-level employment volatility do the explanatory variables account for? 
       
Accounting for Volatility   
We parse out contributions to volatility using auxiliary regressions, which are then 
used to generate bounds on the size of the contributions of each variable or subset of 
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The R
2 from this regression gives the upper bound for the contribution of the macro 
factors, since all co-variance between them and the excluded aggregate variables is 
allocated to the macro factors.  We refer to the R
2 from Equation (4) as
2
M R .  Similarly, a 
second auxiliary regression that includes only the state-specific variables maximizes the 
measured contribution of these variables since all co-variance with the now excluded 
macro factors is ascribed to them. The R
2 from this equation is called
2
S R . 
Panel A of Table 3 presents the goodness of fit statistics for the three models 
estimated thus far.  Panel A of the table presents the R
2 for the full equation (call this 
2
ALL R ), and the R
2s for the equations that contain only macro variables and only the state-  16
specific variables, respectively. 
2
ALL R indicates that the full model explains 49 percent of 
the total variation in state-level employment volatility.  The
2
S R  for the state-specific 
variables indicates that these variables explain at most 16 percent of the variation in 
employment growth volatility.  The 
2
M R  for the macro variables indicates that these 
variables alone explain at most 46 percent of the variation.   
 The  various  R
2 given in Table 3 separately represent the maximum contributions 
for either the macro variable taken together or for the state variables as a group.  We can 
also generate lower bound estimates for the contribution both of the state and macro 
variables.  An estimate of the lower bound for the contribution of macro factors is 
obtained by subtracting 
2
S R  from the R
2 of the full equation, 
2
ALL R .  We refer to this lower 
bound estimate for macro variables as
2
LM R  (i.e.,
222
LMA L L S R RR = − ).  An analogous exercise 
is conducted to get the lower bound for the contribution of the state-specific variables, 
2
LS R  (i.e.,
22 2
LSA L L M R RR =− ).    
Panel B of Table 3 presents estimates of the combined effects of the macro variables 
versus the combined effects of state-level variables.  As can be seen, the range of 
contributions for the macroeconomic variables is between 34 percent and 46 percent of 
the total variation in employment growth volatility.  The range of potential contributions 
from the state-specific factors is 4 percent to 16 percent.  Consequently, macro variables 
have likely played a more important role than the state-specific factors.  However, the 
contributions of state-specific factors, which have received little attention in the volatility 
literature, appear to be important. State-specific factors account for between about 8   17
percent of the total explained variation in volatility (3.8 percent/49 percent) to around 33 
percent. 
  We also isolate the contribution of five individual variables (variance in monetary 
policy, oil price shocks, the ADS index, financial deregulation, and changing share of 
manufacturing employment) in the same way as we did for the groups of macro.  For 
example, to isolate the effects of monetary policy, we first re-estimate equation (3) but 
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where Monpol refers to the monetary policy variable.  The first summation on the right-
hand side of equation (4) gives the common (across states) aggregate effect of the 
variance of monetary policy.  The second summation gives the state-specific responses to 
the variance of policy. The R
2 from this regression gives the upper bound for the 
contribution of monetary policy, since all co-variance between policy and the excluded 
variables is allocated to monetary policy.  We refer to the R
2 from the estimation of 
equation (4) as
2
P R .  
  An estimate of the lower bound for the contribution of monetary policy is 
generated by estimating a second auxiliary regression that includes all the variables 
except for monetary policy.  The R
2 from this equation, called
2
NP R , maximizes the 
measured contribution of the non-monetary-policy variables since all co-variance with 
the now excluded policy variable is ascribed to the other variables.  Thus, subtracting 
2
NP R  from
2
ALL R  yields the lower bound for monetary policy.  That is, the lower bound   18
estimate,
2
L R , is defined as 
22 2
L ALL NP R RR =− .  This procedure was likewise followed to 
obtain estimates of the ranges of contributions for oil prices, the ADS index, financial 
deregulation and the growth in the manufacturing employment share.   
Table 4 contains the range of contributions of each of the individual variables used in 
the regression.  Among the macro variables, monetary policy accounts for between 5 
percent and 15 percent of the variation.  The upper end of the range for monetary policy 
is similar to the estimated explanatory power of monetary policy found by Leduc and Sill 
(2007) when examining the post-1984 decline in GDP volatility.  Oil prices explain 
around 4 percent to 8 percent, while the aggregate activity index explains around 3 
percent to 6 percent. 
The results show that each of the state-level variables has played a role in explaining 
volatility.  The change in states’ manufacturing shares explains at most only about 3 
percent, while deregulation of interstate banking could explain an additional 7 percent.  
The results once again suggest the importance of incorporating state-level factors into an 
analysis of volatility. 
5.  CONCLUSION 
We document a general decline in the volatility of employment growth and examine 
some of its possible sources.  A unique aspect of our analysis is the use of state-level 
panel data on employment growth from 1956 to 2002.  Panel data allow a richer analysis 
than one based only on time series data (e.g., Stock and Watson, 2002) or alternatively on 
cross-sectional data (e.g., Hammond and Thompson, 2004).  Indeed, the decline in 
employment growth volatility was found to be widespread across states, albeit to   19
differing degrees, suggesting a role for state-specific factors as well as common national 
influences. 
Our analysis, which includes both state-specific and macroeconomic variables, 
indicates that each of these factors plays a significant role in explaining fluctuations in 
employment growth volatility.  The range of possible contributions of state-specific 
variables in the full sample was found to be less than that of the macro variables but 
nonetheless important.  Among the aggregate factors separately identified, monetary 
policy, changes in the inventory-to-sales ratio, changes in the ratio of total trade to GDP, 
and oil prices significantly affected state-level volatility, although to differing degrees.  
With regard to state-level factors, the share of state total employment in 
manufacturing and state banking deregulation each contributed significantly to 
fluctuations in volatility.  These variables were found to matter even after controlling for 
state fixed effects and state-specific time trends.  In sum, these findings show that sub-
national data can be important for understanding the variety of forces that buffet both 
state and national economies.   20
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Table 1: Average State Volatilities and Volatility Trends 




b   State  Volatility
a Trend
b 
AL 0.49802  -0.00244  NC  0.53025  -0.00198
AR 0.53859  -0.00208  ND  0.52111  -0.00234
AZ 0.71098  -0.00077  NE  0.44361  -0.00265
CA 0.49827  -0.00223  NH  0.68634  -0.00089
CO 0.53919  -0.00189  NJ  0.43873  -0.00275
CT 0.56612  -0.00191  NM  0.48175  -0.00242
DE 0.65393  -0.00146  NV  0.71888  -0.00070
FL 0.55893  -0.00183  NY  0.42466  -0.00284
GA 0.54270  -0.00183  OH  0.60275  -0.00212
IA 0.52462  -0.00222  OK  0.54294  -0.00198
ID 0.60956  -0.00173  OR  0.62369  -0.00153
IL 0.50458  -0.00248  PA  0.48945  -0.00293
IN 0.69424  -0.00143  RI  0.63446  -0.00162
KS 0.53205  -0.00221  SC  0.56130  -0.00173
KY 0.58310  -0.00203  SD  0.50961  -0.00224
LA 0.59346  -0.0018  TN  0.54468  -0.00203
MA 0.56210  -0.00186  TX  0.49588  -0.00223
MD 0.51020  -0.00232  UT  0.54198  -0.00198
ME 0.57890  -0.00175  VA  0.46115  -0.00238
MI 0.85896  -0.00084  VT  0.57681  -0.00185
MN 0.47601  -0.00268  WA  0.59701  -0.00179
MO 0.47987  -0.00254  WI  0.48124  -0.00262
MS 0.59231  -0.00152  WV  0.82568  -0.00064
MT 0.63037  -0.00168  WY  0.83236  -0.00034
aWeighted average using employment in each year. 
bState volatility trends estimated using a weighted OLS regression of volatility on state-specific time 
trends.  Weights are state employment levels.   24
 
Table 2: F Tests for the Estimated Coefficients
† 
 
Variable  F Test for Joint 
Significance 
F Test for Equality of 
Coefficients 
State dummies  100.0***  98.8*** 
    
Time dummies  1685.4***  1708.4*** 
    
State-specific time trends  96.4***  94.5*** 
    
State-specific deregulation 
dummies  116.4*** 115.0*** 
    
Change in manufacturing share  3.70*  na 
    
Monetary policy variance  194.5***  202.6*** 
    
Hamilton oil price index   247.1***  251.3*** 
    
Aggregate activity index  72.5***  73.4*** 




Table 3:  The Contribution of National vs. State-Specific Variables to 
Employment Volatility 





Full equation  0.4944 
Only national variables
a
  0.4561 
Only state-specific variables











33.8 percent to 45.6 percent 
 
3.8 percent to 15.7 percent 
 
 
a The national  regression includes the time fixed effects, an aggregate time trend, and the interacted macro 
variables.  
 
b The state-specific regression includes state fixed effects, state-specific time trends, deregulation dummies, 
and manufacturing share of total state employment.   
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Table 4:  Accounting for Employment 
Volatility in the Full Sample 
(1956:2 to 2002:4) 
 
Equation Specification
a  Contribution to Volatility 
National variables   
Monetary Policy Variance    5.3 percent to 14.9 percent 
Oil prices  3.8 percent to 8.3 percent 
Aggregate Activity Index  2.7 percent to 5.5 percent 
State variables   
Deregulation  1.6 percent to 6.5 percent 
Manufacturing employment share  1.1 percent to 2.5 percent 
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